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Motivation 
1.  On-line scams (pharmacy sales, 
phishing sites) continually evolve 
2.  Most recently, using multiple levels/
types of indirection (HTTP, DNS) 
3.  Existing passive traffic analysis 
techniques rely on IP addresses, 
communication structure, redirection 
patterns, etc – can be evaded 
4.  Traffic characteristics should be 
agnostic to evasion 
Redirection Summary 
•  Scam URLs = 23,762, 1.45 per 
•  Non-Scam URLs = 3,075, 1.8 per 
•  Does redirection information still 
aid in discrimination? 
Experiment 
•  Web-crawl: Alexa Top 10K and 35K 
known-scam URLs from spam sink 
•  Record transport layer information of each 
HTTP GET (including redirections): 
•  Find statistical discriminators between 
scam and non-scam hosts 
Facts 
1.  Prior work finds significant redirection 
and traffic proxying by botnets 
2.  Scam content hosted by bot CDNs and 
by countries with poor connectivity 
 
Scam Connectivity “Quality” 
1.  We’re agnostic to IP, DNS names, registrars, etc. 
2.  Collect Transport-layer traffic features that reveal: 
•  Asymmetric bandwidth 
•  Busy bots and/or poorly connected hosts 
3.  More detailed than NetFlow-style statistics: 
•  Retransmits (in/out) 
•  RSTs/FINs (in/out) 
•  Congestion Window (min, zero) 
•  3WHS and per-segment RTT variance 




•  Very different distributions (scam/
non-scam) depending on 
redirection stage (initial, 
intermediate, terminal) 
•  Confirms previous observations 
that bots perform redirection 
First URL Intermediate URL Final URL 
Minimum Congestion Window over Flow Lifetime 
Estimated RTT Variance over Flow Lifetime 
First URL Intermediate URL Final URL 
Classification 
• Using data with 50% “good”, 50% 
“scam”: 
Method Acc Sens Spec PPV NPV 
Bayes 0.760 0.715 0.808 0.795 0.731 
SVM 0.874 0.816 0.935 0.929 0.830 
Decision 
Tree 
0.937 0.943 0.931 0.934 0.940 
How connected are scam servers?  
Hypothesis 
Transport-layer traffic analysis of intermediate 
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